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1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a growing
awareness of the importance of taking religion
into consideration within development
initiatives, including in those related to gender
equality. A variety of actors including donor
agencies, transnational development
organisations, and local women’s rights activists
are increasingly using religiously framed
approaches such as utilising religious discourses
(e.g. texts, symbols and language), and/or
working through religious actors (e.g. religious
leaders and institutions) as a means of
promoting women’s rights particularly in Muslim
contexts. This trend has grown out of a
combination of factors including the increasing
awareness of the importance of religion and
culture in development, the emergence over the
past two decades of various forms of Islamic
feminism(s) around the world, as well as a sense
that any social change in Muslim communities
can only take place within the framework of
Islam. However, despite the recent moves to
reconcile religion with women’s rights, little
effort has been made to critically analyse the
implications of such approaches.
This article attempts to do this, first by
contextualising the increasing use of religiously
framed approaches to Muslim women’s rights by
development actors within a wider discussion of
the relationships between women’s rights
struggles and religion in general and the growth
of Islamic feminisms in particular, in various
parts of the world. It then looks more closely at
the experiences of Muslim women’s rights
activists in India, focusing particularly on the
strategies of two networks: the Muslim Women’s
Rights Network (MWRN) and the Bharatiya
Muslim Mahila Andolan (BMMA). Both
networks have engaged positively with Islam at
different times and to differing extents through
the promotion of the ‘woman-friendly’ nikahnama
(marriage contract) and by engaging with the All
India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB).
Through this case study, the article aims to look
critically at the possible advantages and
limitations of engaging with Islam as part of
women’s rights advocacy strategies and asks how
far such strategies can go in changing
entrenched gendered power structures.
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2 Background: using religious framework to
promote women’s rights
Advocates of women’s rights have for long
questioned religious traditions, beliefs and
institutions as part of their struggles for gender
equality, leading to a perceived antagonism
between religion and women’s rights (Phillips
2009; Winter 2001). At the same time, many
feminists and members of women’s movements
have periodically allied with religious groups or
utilised religious discourses in order to promote
gender equality, either as a proactive or a reactive
strategy. Since the 1980s, there has been a general
growth in religious feminisms – or projects that
aim to reclaim and reinterpret religion from
women’s perspectives or in a manner that respects
women’s rights. Reformist feminist traditions
have made great strides in reconciling feminism
with faith in a variety of ways and are challenging
long-held assumptions about the relationship
between women’s rights and religion within
conservative and orthodox religious circles as well
as among secular feminists.
In the case of Islam, there has been a growth in
religious feminisms over the past two decades,
which can be seen partially as a reaction to the
growing strength of conservative Islamist
movements around the world, as well as an
increasing number of Muslim women becoming
scholars of religion. ‘Islamic feminists’, according
to Moghadam (2004: 53), attempt to ‘reclaim
their religion to undermine both Islamist
patriarchal distortions and Western stereotypes
of Islam as backwards and terroristic’.1
Prominent Islamic feminists include individuals
such as Riffat Hassan (2002), Amina Wadud
(2007) and Azizah Al-Hibri (2004), who argue
that Islam is not the cause of women’s
oppression, but rather ‘culture’ and ‘patriarchy’
are to blame. They contend that Muslim women
must reclaim religion from men in order to
uncover the truly egalitarian underpinnings of
Islam (Hashim 1999).
The emergence of various manifestations of
‘Islamic feminism’ has not only been significant
on a discursive level in terms of expanding the
space for debate about gender and Islam, this has
also inspired a variety of ‘practical strategies’ for
securing women’s rights, which Western donors
and transnational development agencies are
increasingly promoting as being more effective,
‘culturally sensitive’ means of advocating for
Muslim women’s rights (UNFPA 2004). These
approaches include working with religious leaders
and institutions as partners in women’s rights
advocacy campaigns as well as encouraging
women to understand and use religious texts and
concepts in order to defend their rights. Many
women’s rights advocates working in Muslim
contexts also argue that religion must play an
intrinsic role in gender-related advocacy
strategies if they are to be acceptable and
successful (Adamu 1999). However, apart from
the work of a limited number of scholars (e.g.
Balchin 2003; Bartelink and Buitelaar 2006), very
little critical examination has taken place as to
what the underlying assumptions and
implications of religiously framed approaches
might be, particularly when they are applied to
the promotion of Muslim women’s rights.
There are several questions that arise when
considering the implications of religiously
framed approaches to women’s rights including:
how far can such approaches go in actually
changing patriarchal power structures? Are
efforts to engage with religious discourses and
actors actually bolstering the authority of what
are essentially patriarchal institutions and
discourses? Or are religiously framed approaches
the only realistic means of protecting women’s
rights in contexts in which communities feel that
Islam is under threat? The remainder of this
article attempts to think through some of these
questions, through an examination of the
experiences of two networks in India, the Muslim
Women’s Rights Network (MWRN) and the
Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (BMMA).
This case study will help illustrate the ground-
level complexities of engaging positively with
religion as part of women’s rights advocacy.
3 Advocating for Muslim women’s rights in
India: the MWRN and the BMMA2
In India, where Muslims are the largest religious
minority, comprising roughly 12 per cent of the
population, the issue of Muslim women’s rights is
particularly sensitive and politicised. ‘Muslim
women’ are constructed as an oppressed
‘minority within a minority’ (Lateef 1998) by
various groups including by Hindu nationalists,
the media and academics, who represent Muslim
women as a homogenous category with a
common set of interests (Kirmani 2009b). The
issue of Muslim women’s rights became an issue
of national debate in the 1980s during the
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landmark Shah Bano case. This case involved a
72-year-old woman who had been divorced and
was claiming maintenance from her husband in
the Madhya Pradesh High Court. This case,
which eventually made it to the Supreme Court,
called the system of separate personal laws3 into
question during a time when religious
sensitivities were particularly high. The Hindu
nationalist movement, which was growing in
strength at the time, used this case to prove that
Muslims were ‘backwards’ and in need of
integration into the ‘Hindu nation’. The Muslim
conservative groups, led by the All India Muslim
Personal Law Board (AIMPLB),4 reacted by
organising massive protests across the country to
uphold Muslim personal laws and protect ‘the
community’ from the interference of the state.
This put the women’s movement, which has been
historically dominated by urban, upper-caste
women, in a difficult position: if they argued for
a universal civil code, they would be aligning
themselves with the Hindu Right, and if they
argued for the maintenance of personal laws,
they would be betraying their secular
underpinnings and the rights of Muslim women.
The women’s movement had to tread a careful
path, arguing for reformed personal laws that
would protect women’s rights. The Congress
government eventually passed the Muslim
Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act
1986,5 which effectively exempted Muslim
women from the purview of state laws, and
maintained the system of separate personal laws.
Throughout these debates, Muslim women were
themselves largely absent (Chhachhi 1991;
Hasan 1994, 1998; Kumar 1994; Kishwar 1998).
Since this time, however, Muslim women-led
groups and networks have begun emerging in
urban centres across the country, and although
they may be relatively few in number, their voices
are increasingly gaining national attention
through their participation in debates related to
Muslim women’s rights. Members of networks,
such as the Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan
(BMMA), which consciously take an ‘Islamic
feminist’ approach and the Muslim Women’s
Rights Network (MWRN),6 which is committed to
secular feminism, challenge the dominant
construction of the ‘oppressed Muslim woman’ by
presenting themselves as articulate and powerful
agents, while continuing to draw attention to the
multiple forms of discrimination and exclusion
that Muslim women in India face. They rally
around the issue of personal laws and women’s
matrimonial rights, presenting a counter-voice to
the conservative position taken by the All India
Muslim Personal Law Board, as well as highlighting
wider issues faced by Muslim women that have not
been addressed by the ulema (scholars of Islam),
the state, or in any depth by the mainstream
women’s movement including religious and
gender-based insecurity resulting from
communal violence as well as social, economic
and political marginalisation and discrimination.
One of the strategies employed by advocates of
Muslim women’s rights in India as well as in
other countries, has been to popularise the
notion that women can write or have input in
their own nikahnamas (Muslim marriage
contracts), particularly in terms of inserting
clauses that will secure their rights within
marriage. Muslim women’s rights activists have
proposed the idea of a ‘woman-friendly’
nikahnama as a means of protecting women’s
rights without challenging the system of separate
personal laws. Many women’s organisations
including those within the MWRN and BMMA
have produced ‘model nikhanamas’, which differ
slightly in their content, but for the most part
include provisions to protect women from
arbitrary divorce and give them the right to
divorce and to claim their mehr,7 to prohibit
polygamy, and to guarantee women the right to
maintenance in the case of divorce. The
campaign to protect women’s matrimonial rights
has taken place at the national level, through
lobbying the AIMPLB to agree to reform Muslim
personal laws or to produce their own model
nikahnama as well as at the local level, through
community education and the public
performance of individual and group marriage
ceremonies using model nikahnamas.
Although women’s rights activists have always
been critical of the AIMPLB and have questioned
its authority, especially since the Shah Bano case,
they have also been aware of the influence this
body has at the national level because it is seen
as a source of religious authority by many
Muslims. Naseem, who is based in Delhi and is
active in the MWRN, pointed to the positive
influence the AIMPLB could have:
If the Personal Law Board puts forward a nikahnama
then people will follow it ... if the Network [MWRN]
puts out the same nikahnama, people will not use it.
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We put a lot of effort into drafting it, but it’s just
sitting there. No one is ready to use it because
everything that is written in it is in favour of women.
(Naseem, 20 September 2008)
For this reason, since the MWRN was created, its
members have been lobbying the AIMPLB to
agree to a reformed set of personal laws or to
adopt the network’s model nikahnama or to propose
its own version that would protect women’s rights.
This has mostly been done through letters that
documented individual cases of women who were
struggling to secure their rights within their
marriages in order to illustrate the need for the
AIMPLB to address these issues publicly. The
AIMPLB did not respond to these letters.
However, in 2001, the Board finally agreed to call
a meeting in Delhi, which several members of
the MWRN as well as other women’s rights
activists from across the country were invited to
attend. During this meeting, women’s rights
activists presented their testimonies to the
Board, pointing to the lack of legal safeguards
for women and the need for reform, especially on
the issue of divorce. However, the accounts of
many of the activists interviewed who attended
the meeting, reflected a fundamental lack of
understanding between women’s rights activists
and Board members, many of whom seemed
more interested in the appearance of the women
present, being critical of the fact that they were
not practicing parda,8 rather than the content of
what they were saying.
One of the reasons for the lack of progress at the
2001 meeting and subsequently, is a fundamental
difference in approach between women’s rights
activists and the Personal Law Board on the
question of religion. SQR Ilyas, who is a member
of the AIMPLB as well as being active in Jamaat-
e-Islami, pointed out that the Personal Law Board
works within a particular Islamic framework:
The Muslim Personal Law Board cannot do anything
that goes against Islam. … Questions can only arise
if you and I have a difference of interpretation between
us. The only interpretation of Islam that can be
acceptable is the one that Allah and his Prophet and
his companions and the people that followed them
have agreed upon. There can be no such interpretation
that the umma [Muslim community] doesn’t have an
agreement on.
(SQR Ilyas, 16 December 2008)
Therefore, for example, on the issue of banning
triple talaq – the practice in which a man is
allowed to divorce his wife simply by uttering the
words, ‘I divorce you’ three times – the AIMPLB
has refused to take a firm stand against this
practice. This is because, although there are
differences in opinion on this issue between
different Islamic schools of thought, the general
consensus among the Indian ulema has been that
this practice is frowned upon but not forbidden
in Islamic law. Women’s rights activists, on the
other hand, place women’s rights first and argue,
either from an Islamic or human rights
perspective, that triple talaq should be banned
outright because it contradicts the principles of
justice and equality.
Furthermore, members of the Law Board
pointed out at the meeting that they had no
power to change the laws since the Board is not a
legislative body and is rather ‘just an NGO’ like
the women’s organisations at the meeting. This
may have been a convenient way for the AIMPLB
to abdicate any responsibility to protect women’s
rights, but for many of the women’s rights
activists at the meeting, it was a wake-up call,
both because they realised that the AIMPLB
does not have any legal powers and because of
the Board’s perceived unwillingness to engage
seriously with their concerns. Nevertheless,
people like Naila, who is a member of the
MWRN, feel that the AIMPLB has influence
despite its lack of statutory powers:
What is the Muslim Personal Law Board? It is only
an NGO like us, but because it has political
acceptance within the community when it comes to
matters of personal law … they have a kind of
emotional acceptance amongst people. Otherwise, they
don’t have any [legal] recognition … but yes, they
have a say within the community.
(Naila, 26 December 2008)
Despite their recognition of the AIMPLB’s
symbolic power, after the 2001 meeting, many
women’s organisations, including those affiliated
with the MWRN, abandoned the strategy of
engaging with the AIMPLB.
Noorjehan Safia Niaz, who is one of the founding
members of the BMMA, said that, although
some still feel that it is worthwhile to work with
the AIMPLB, she felt that it would be a ‘futile
effort’:
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We can do so [engage with the AIMPLB] if we have
to, but I believe that that energy could be saved for
strengthening the community, giving them more
information, mobilising them — it is a better use of
energy and resources.
(Noorjehan Safia Niaz, 22 September 2008)
Hasina Khan, who is one of the founders of the
MWRN, echoed these sentiments, saying that
AeN had spent ten years lobbying the AIMPLB
with little or no result and have therefore
decided to abandon this ‘bankrupt strategy’ to
focus on other forms of lobbying (Hasina Khan,
26 September 2008).
At the same time, the 2001 meeting and the
ongoing efforts of women’s rights advocates may
have prompted processes of change within the
AIMPLB by contributing to debates that had
already been taking place within the Board on
the issue of the nikahnama and on women’s rights
in general. A draft version of a model nikahnama,
produced internally, was first presented within
the AIMPLB at a meeting held in Bangalore a
year before the 2001 meeting with women’s
groups. Begum Naseem Iqtedar Ali, who is the
first and only woman member of the AIMPLB’s
Executive Committee, described how the
nikahnama was nearly passed by the Board at that
time, but was finally rejected over the issue of
talaq-e-tafweez, or women’s right of divorce:
What happened was that the nikahnama was passed
by the Executive Committee, but it also needed to be
passed in the General Assembly. During that evening
in the place where we were staying, one group of
women was against it. There was so much debate and
discussion between the two groups … I just wanted it
to be passed, but no one would listen. Those women
convinced the rest of the group, so that when it was
presented, it was those women who opposed it. What
people then said was that if women are themselves
opposed to it, then how can we pass it?
(Begum Naseem Iqtedar Ali, 23 December
2008)
Those who opposed the Board’s draft nikahnama
argued that, including a clause on women’s right
to divorce would be considered inauspicious at
the time of a marriage and it should therefore be
left out of the document. Uzma Naheed, who is a
member of the General Assembly and who argues
for women’s rights within an Islamic framework,
also pointed out that, of the women members of
the AIMPLB, who constitute less than 10 per cent
of the Board, few are advocates of women’s rights,
noting the lack of consensus even among
‘religious women’ (19 September 2008).
Eventually, the AIMPLB did pass a model
nikahnama at a meeting held in Bhopal. However,
this nikahnama disappointed many women’s rights
advocates, both within the MWRN and the
BMMA and beyond. Although it did include some
‘progressive’ features, which addressed the
demands of women’s groups, including
recommending a process of mediation and
arbitration before a divorce can take place,
discouraging the practice of dowry, recording the
amount of mehr to be given to the bride, and
including a clause stipulating that a man must get
written consent from his wife if he wishes to re-
marry, it also included some regressive features.
For example, the model included guidelines
stating that a woman should be obedient to her
husband and that she should ask his permission
before stepping out of the house. As well, it did
not ban the practice of triple talaq and did not
include a woman’s right to divorce her husband
(Katakam 2005). Most women’s rights advocates
saw the AIMPLB’s nikahnama as further evidence
of the Board’s rigidity rather than a sign of
progress. Furthermore, there is no evidence that
the Board has gone beyond simply issuing their
model nikahnama in terms of actively encouraging
its adoption or promoting the concept at the
grassroots level among local clerics.
On the other hand, the AIMPLB’s effort can also
be viewed as a sign of positive change in response
to internal processes of change and years of
lobbying by women’s rights advocates and might
thus be seen as evidence of the women’s rights
activists effecting a transformation of a key
religious institution. Naila has studied the
AIMPLB’s nikahnama closely, and described her
mixed feelings about the AIMPLB’s efforts:
I took it as a positive step because I didn’t have any
hope that those people [the AIMPLB] would bring
out a nikahnama. At least they are issuing some
guidelines. Till then they hadn’t even done that.
Because as a Muslim woman, my question has always
been, why do they [religious leaders] talk about the
ways you can rule over women and not the rights that
women have, when these things are present within
Islam? ...  If you look at it that way, then for the first
time, in the light of Islam, at least they are saying
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something about women’s rights, but after reading it,
I also felt that we are asking for something, and they
are benevolently bestowing this upon us, which I don’t
look at positively. 
(Naila, 26 December 2008)
For Naila, the fact that the AIMPLB had made
any kind of public statement in relation to
women’s rights was a step in the right direction
and a sign that the Board was changing, however
slowly. At the same time, she took issue with the
manner in which the nikahnama was presented, as
a pronouncement rather than a contribution to a
process of dialogue, which was similar to the
complaints of women’s rights advocates after the
2001 meeting.
4 Advocating for the nikahnama at the
community level: reflections from the field
Apart from lobbying the AIMPLB at the national
level, members of MWRN and BMMA continue
to promote the woman-friendly nikahnama within
local communities across the country. Groups
such as Awaaz-e-Niswan, which is part of the
MWRN, and the Women’s Research and Action
Group, members of which are part of the
BMMA, in Mumbai educate women and their
families about the fact that they can add clauses
to a nikahnama as a means of ensuring a woman’s
security, through individual and group
discussions at the local level. The MWRN and
the BMMA have also facilitated public weddings
using their model nikahnamas, with the wedding
of Naish’s Hassan, who is one of the leaders of
the BMMA, capturing national attention because
it was being performed by a prominent woman,
Syeda Hameed, and used a model nikahnama
(Wajihuddin 2008).
However, although exact figures are not
available, most activists acknowledge that the
number of marriages that have actually taken
place using these model nikahnamas remains
relatively limited. There are several possible
reasons for this. Yasmeen, who is a member of
Awaaz-e-Niswan, said that it is often the qazi
(cleric), who performs the ceremony and whose
stamp is required to validate the nikahnama, who
proves to be the main stumbling block: ‘The
main problem is that, no matter which nikahnama
it is, the qazi is not ready to use it. The first
problem is that he himself is a man and all of
this is about women’s rights’ (Yasmeen, 20
September 2008). Over the years, women’s
groups have identified ‘sympathetic’ qazis in their
localities, who have agreed to perform weddings
using the groups’ nikahnamas. However, even if
the qazi agrees, often the groom’s family will
raise objections, and in some cases, the bride
herself is reported to have refused, possibly out
of fear of upsetting her in-laws or her own family
by appearing too bold or demanding.
Apart from the practical difficulties of gaining
acceptance for progressive nikahnamas, Hasina
Khan points to the limitations of nikahnamas as a
means of achieving broad-based social change:
As good as a nikahnama is, if a woman can’t choose
her own partner, if a woman isn’t able to speak to her
partner and they have no understanding between each
other, then what’s the point?
(Hasina, 16 September 2008)
She gave the example of women who do not want
to get married at all, or who are not allowed to
choose their husbands, to illustrate the gender-
based restrictions of the wider social context.
Hence, she asserted, although the nikahnama is a
tool in the promotion of women’s rights, this
document alone can do little to transform
existing structures of power. Instead, she
suggested, it can only provide a degree of
protection for women within the current system.
At the same time, the fact that the nikahnama
does not pose a radical challenge is also most
likely the reason that it has been so widely
promoted by a range of women’s groups and
religious organisations.
Despite its limitations and its lack of wide-scale
acceptance, the promotion of the nikahnama has
been successful in raising general awareness
among Muslims on the issue of women’s rights.
Members of Awaaz-e-Niswan spoke about how
the promotion of the nikahnama is beginning to
change attitudes among members of the
community as well as qazis in Mumbra, a
predominantly Muslim area located on the
outskirts of Mumbai:
Yes, awareness has been raised. Whether people use the
nikahnama or not, they have started to understand
what issues they can raise with the qazi. They know
that the amount of mehr should be written down.
There has been more awareness about these issues
through the nikahnama.
(Naseem, 20 September 2008)
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Aqeela, who works as a librarian in AeN’s
Rehnuma Centre and is also involved in case
work and advocacy, added:
What has happened in Mumbra is that many of the
nikahnamas that are being used today at least have clear
information about mehr, so that if there are problems, at
least you have some proof … if the information about
mehr is clear, then you are more likely to receive it …
there are a lot of cases in which the girl has received the
mehr that she has been promised.
(Aqeela, 20 September 2008)
Hence, members of the MWRN and the BMMA
agreed that the model nikahnama can be an
important means of protecting particular
women’s rights within the current social and
legal system in India and in a context where
many Muslims, and especially the ulema, feel
threatened by any suggested change to Muslim
personal laws. They also reported that the
nikahnama campaign has been an important
means of gaining support and building linkages
between women’s organisations and with diverse
actors, as a result strengthening both the
MWRN and the BMMA.
Although the nikahnama can be cited as an
example of women’s rights activists successfully
utilising a concept that fits into an Islamic
framework to protect the interests of women, at
the same time, its impact has been limited
because it is unable to challenge wider social
attitudes and structures of power. The fact that
the AIMPLB, qazis and women’s families
themselves are hesitant to adopt a ‘woman-
friendly’ nikahnama reflects the deep-seated nature
of patriarchal power structures in Indian society.
An analysis of the nikahnama campaign and the
engagement of Muslim women’s rights activists
with the AIMPLB raise wider questions as to how
far working within an Islamic framework and
within religious institutions can actually challenge
patriarchal structures of power.
5 Conclusions
Although women’s rights activists in Muslim
contexts, such as those involved in Muslim
women-led networks in India, have been
engaging with Islam in diverse and creative ways
for decades, the drive to engage with Islam has
occurred more recently among international
development agencies and often springs from the
notion that Muslim women are particularly
oppressed and in need of rescuing (Abu-Lughod
2002) and that this can only be effectively
achieved through ‘internal reform’. The case
study of the MWRN and the BMMA
demonstrates some of the complexities of
negotiating with religious concepts and actors as
part of women’s rights advocacy that may be
instructive for other development actors.
The case study demonstrates some of the
advantages of engaging positively with religious
discourses and actors as part of women’s rights
advocacy. Using Islamic concepts such as the
nikahnama can effectively deflect accusations of
taking a ‘Western’ or anti-Muslim approach,
especially in a context such as the Indian one in
which Muslim identity is considered to be ‘under
threat’. In such situations, it is often necessary for
women’s rights advocates to use Islamic
arguments to counter criticisms. Furthermore, on
issues such as personal laws, which in many
contexts are based on particular interpretations
of Sharia, women’s rights advocates have had
little choice but to work within a religious
framework by presenting alternate
interpretations of Islam. Therefore, although
model nikahnamas may not be used on a wide-scale
in India yet, there is evidence that this campaign
is helping to raise awareness in a slow and steady
manner about women’s rights within Islam.
Furthermore, engaging with religious institutions
such as the AIMPLB can create spaces and
opportunities for dialogue with those that may
otherwise be left out of gender-related initiatives.
Working with religious leaders, who are by and
large men and who often have access to large
numbers of male community members, can be an
effective means of involving men in gender-
related advocacy campaigns. Such efforts can
help convince those who may otherwise be
sceptical of the importance of protecting women’s
rights and can help stimulate a wider dialogue
about gender relations. Hence, although the
AIMPLB initially resisted the lobbying efforts of
Muslim women’s rights activists, ignoring their
letters and denying them a respectful hearing
during the 2001 meeting, they did eventually
release a model nikahnama that, although limited
in its scope, can be seen as a first step in
protecting women’s matrimonial rights.
At the same time, working with and through
religious leaders and institutions, such as the
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AIMPLB may also have unintended negative
consequences. Approaches that focus on working
with religious leaders or that rely on them to
communicate gender-related messages run the
risk of legitimising their authority within the
community rather than challenging structures of
power that keep women in subjugated positions.
While religious leaders may be influential
members of the community, by highlighting their
role and seeking their support, as the Muslim
women’s rights activists had done previously by
lobbying for the AIMPLB to change its position,
women’s rights advocates may be inadvertently
validating the power of particular groups of elite
men rather than empowering women to claim
their own rights. As Pearson and Tomalin (2008)
note, the ‘rush’ to engage with religious leaders
and institutions, who often hold conservative
positions regarding gender roles and relations as
was demonstrated by the AIMPLB’s nikahnama,
may actually endanger the gains that have been
won over the past decades by women’s rights
activists. This is the conclusion that many
Muslim women’s rights activists arrived at
following the 2001 meeting when they realised
that lobbying that particular institution was
having little impact. The strategy of denying the
authority of religious leaders and institutions
and empowering women to take control of their
own rights, whether within or outside of an
Islamic framework, was seen as a more
constructive use of the limited resources of
women’s organisations.
Apart from the risks involved in engaging with
religious actors, Islamically framed approaches,
such as the nikahnama campaign tend to privilege
what is outlined in religious texts as the only
legitimate framework for claiming rights. Mirza
(2008: 31) points out that by privileging textual
approaches to Islam, ironically, Islamic feminists
follow the same methodological lines as
Islamists: ‘both are anchored in the central texts
of the Quran and the hadith literature; both
represent their own interpretation as the
expression of authentic or ‘true’ Islam; and both
discourses have appropriated the notion of the
ideal past of Islam as the foundation of law’.
Hence, Islamic approaches to women’s rights
advocacy can inadvertently reinforce the notion
that the lives of Muslim women must be
governed solely by religious precepts and that
women must work through Islam in order to
claim their rights, thus limiting the space for
secular approaches (Balchin 2003; Kandiyoti
1991; Zia 2009).
Furthermore, privileging religious strategies or
organising on the basis of religious identity, which
the BMMA does by ensuring that 70 per cent of
their membership is comprised of Muslim women
and that they are led by Muslim women, can give
groups greater credibility to represent ‘Muslim
women’, especially in the Indian context where
the women’s movement has historically been led
by upper caste Hindu women. However, such
strategies can also reinforce and essentialise
religious differences and reinforce the notion that
Muslim women form a coherent group with a
common set of interests. Such strategies can also
limit the possibility of building different types of
alliances among those committed to justice and
equality, such as those based on ideological rather
than religious similarities.
The case study of the MWRN and the BMMA
reflects the complexity of working within a
religious framework in order to claim women’s
rights. While the political situation in India has
left very little space for secular feminist
positions, such as those that argue against
religious-based personal laws and for a common
civil code, the experiences of Muslim women’s
rights activists demonstrates the limitations of
engaging proactively with religious discourses
and actors. Although the nikahnama campaign
and the efforts to lobby the AIMPLB have
succeeded in raising awareness about Muslim
women’s rights, no reform has yet been made to
Muslim personal laws. Furthermore, only a
handful of marriages have taken place which use
the model nikahnama, whether it is the
progressive model put forward by women’s
organisations or the conservative model of the
AIMPLB. The fact that women are themselves
hesitant to claim their rights even if they are
convinced that it is sanctioned within Islam
speaks to the wider patriarchal structures that
continue to exist in Indian society, which
religious concepts alone cannot dismantle.
However, the emergence of the MWRN and the
BMMA is itself a significant development in the
Indian context, where the women’s movement
has historically been dominated by upper-caste
Hindu women. These networks have been
successful in questioning the authority of
religious institutions and have highlighted the
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fact that there are multiple interpretations of
Islam, including those that value justice and
equality. Through their campaigning efforts,
they have widened the space for debate about the
relationship between Islam and women’s rights,
and have challenged the image of Muslim
women as passive victims. The MWRN and the
BMMA employ ‘strategic essentialism’ (Spivak
1990) by using the unifying category ‘Muslim
women’ in order to organise for greater rights.
Their strategies of selectively engaging with
religious concepts and actors, reflect the
changing realities and constraints of the political
situation in India in which the language of
secularism has been co-opted by Hindu
nationalist groups, and Muslim identity has been
increasingly viewed as being ‘under threat’.
These strategies have evolved out of decades of
struggle and careful negotiation among Indian
feminists, which has led some Muslim women’s
rights activists to the conclusion that creating
alternative spaces for engaging with religious
concepts, may be an effective means of claiming
women’s rights without denying the importance
of religious identities.
The lesson to be learned is that religiously
framed approaches may be an effective means of
redefining the relationship between religion and
women’s rights and of undermining the authority
of conservative, male-dominated institutions to
represent ‘the community’. However, such
strategies must be accompanied by an awareness
of the possible dangers of partnering with
religious institutions, the limitations of using
religious concepts in challenging wider social
structures, and an understanding that these
steps must be taken in a manner that does not
essentialise or privilege religious identities by
erecting boundaries between groups and
particularly among those committed to the
common cause of social justice and equality. The
multiple approaches adopted by Muslim women’s
rights activists in advocating for women’s
matrimonial rights in India demonstrate the
flexibility and dynamism that is necessary in
order to effectively advocate for change in the
face of evolving political and social restraints.
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Notes
1 Moghadam distinguishes between ‘Islamic
feminists’ and ‘Muslim feminists’ who she
argues are ‘believing women’ who are critical
of Islamist politics and who use a mixture of
religious terminology and the secular
language of international human rights in
calling for reform.
2 This case study is based on research I
conducted in 2008 as part of the Religions and
Development Research Programme
(www.rad.bham.ac.uk), which is funded by the
UK Department for International
Development (DFID). However, the views
expressed in this article are my own and do
not necessarily reflect those of DFID. For a
more detailed discussion of this case study
within the context of Muslim women-led
networks in India, see Kirmani (2009a).
3 India has a separate set of personal laws for
each religious group, Hindus, Muslims,
Christians and Parsis, which was put in place
during the period of British colonial rule.
These laws deal with issues related to the
family, including marriage and inheritance.
4 The All India Muslim Personal Law Board
(AIMPLB) was created in 1973 in India with
the primary aim of protecting Muslim
personal laws from government interference.
Since this time, the AIMPLB has publically
commented on a number of issues related to
the status of Muslims in India, including
prominent cases involving women’s rights as
well as issues such as the Babri Masjid
demolition. It is a mostly male body composed
of a mixture of ulema as well as lay people
from various parts of the country representing
different Islamic schools of thought.
5 Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on
Divorce) Act 1986. Act No. 25 of 1986 dated
19 May, 1986.
6 Both networks, which are comprised of
individuals and groups advocating for Muslim
women’s rights, emerged relatively recently,
with the MWRN formed in 1999 and the
BMMA in 2005.
7 Mehr is a gift given by a husband to his wife,
which is obligatory in Islam. Mehr can be in
the form of cash or in kind, and is intended to
be an expression of appreciation as well as a
form of social guarantee for women. Many
argue that mehr should be given at the time of
marriage, although this rarely occurs in
practice in the South Asian context.
8 Parda refers to the practice of female seclusion
and veiling in South Asia.
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